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637 
PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES:   
A DEBATE OVER LAW OR POLITICS? 
Cary Coglianese* 
In their recent book documenting presidential assertions of au-
thority, The Unitary Executive:  Presidential Power from Washington to 
Bush, Professors Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo argue that 
presidential practice throughout American history supports the view 
that the “Constitution gives presidents the power to control their 
subordinates.”1  Published in the closing year of the administration of 
George W. Bush, The Unitary Executive appeared at a time of consider-
able scholarly and political criticism of President Bush for his efforts 
to direct the actions of federal administrative agencies.  To some, 
Bush’s efforts to influence the decisions of political appointees head-
ing executive branch agencies “crossed the line” between permissible 
and impermissible efforts to control agency officials exercising au-
thority delegated directly to them rather than to the President.2  Ca-
labresi and Yoo show that the kinds of actions Bush took, as well as 
the kinds of criticisms he received, are far from new in American his-
tory.  To the contrary, they assert that the debate over presidential 
authority of the executive branch is the “oldest . . . debate[] in consti-
tutional law.”3 
From the vantage point of President Obama’s first year in office, 
we can safely conclude that this debate did not end with the depar-
ture of President Bush.  Despite the current President’s efforts to dis-
tance his administration’s style and rhetoric from that of his prede-
cessor’s, Obama has nevertheless taken steps much like his 
predecessors’ to ensure that executive branch agencies act in ways 
consistent with his priorities.  Given the longstanding historical prac-
 
 * Deputy Dean and Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School; Director, Penn Program on Regulation.  The au-
thor thanks Evan Mendelson for research assistance and the Journal staff, especially Klair 
Spiller, for editorial assistance. 
 1 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 4 (2008) [hereinafter CALABRESI & YOO]; see also id. 
at 420–27. 
 2 Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or “The Decider”?  The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 696, 700–02 (2007). 
 3 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 3. 
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tices chronicled by Calabresi and Yoo, no one should find it surpris-
ing that President Obama has exhibited strong presidentialist ten-
dencies even in his earliest days in office.  Yet so far Obama’s efforts 
to influence administrative agencies have tended to escape criticism 
from many of the same quarters critical of similar efforts by President 
Bush.  Of course, this too is hardly surprising.  Democrats can be ex-
pected to be more critical of the exercise of presidential power by 
Republican Presidents, and vice versa. 
Such a pattern of criticism raises the question of whether the 
longstanding debate about presidential authority over executive 
branch agencies is less a debate over American constitutional law 
than a debate over American politics.  After all, the purported consti-
tutional line between permissible and impermissible involvement of 
Presidents in administrative agency decision-making—a line Professor 
Peter Strauss has labeled as one between “overseer” and “decider”4—
is so murky and imperceptible that this distinction seems incapable of 
providing a constraining legal principle at all.  Rather than offering a 
legal constraint, those who argue that the Constitution creates such a 
line over the exercise of presidential power seem to offer little more 
than another rhetorical arrow to be flung by political partisans when 
it suits their purposes. 
OBAMA AS PRESIDENTIALIST 
Despite emphasizing “change” as the main theme of his successful 
campaign, President Obama’s early actions indicate that his admini-
stration will remain basically unchanged from its predecessors in at 
least one respect:  its assertion of presidential influence over domestic 
policy decisions by executive branch agencies.  Even in the opening 
weeks of the Obama Administration, the new President showed de-
termination to use his authority to shape the direction of executive 
branch agencies’ making and implementation of public policy. 
Not only did President Obama move swiftly to appoint heads of 
key cabinet departments, but he also appointed a significant number 
of White House “czars,” or policy advisors, to oversee policymaking 
on priority issues from health care reform and economic policy to 
climate change and energy.  The President appointed some of these 
advisors alone, without Senate confirmation, and these czars work 
expressly to “ensure that policymakers across the executive branch 
 
 4 Strauss, supra note 2. 
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work toward the President’s . . . agenda.”5  President Obama also ap-
pointed as his Solicitor General and Administrator of the White 
House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) promi-
nent scholars who have written strong defenses of presidential au-
thority over domestic policymaking.6 
On his very first day in office, President Obama issued a presiden-
tial memorandum on transparency and open government that 
proved distinctive in the way that it asserted authority over independ-
ent agencies.7  President Obama wrote that “[t]he independent agen-
cies should comply with the Open Government Directive,”8 using the 
same verb—“should”—that the memo used for executive branch 
agencies.  Granted, the significance of this choice of language may 
not be self-evident; but interestingly, previous Presidents have made a 
point to distinguish a softer application of their presidential direc-
tives to independent agencies than to executive branch agencies.  For 
example, President Bush only “requested” independent agencies to 
comply with his governmental reform memorandum,9 and President 
Clinton “asked,” “encouraged,” and “requested” independent agen-
cies to comply with his directives.10  President Obama appears pre-
pared to go farther than previous Presidents have in overseeing inde-
pendent agencies. 
Like his predecessors, President Obama also has taken steps that 
“convey the impression that [he is] personally responsible for the 
conduct of domestic governance.”11  Within his first week in office, for 
 
 5 Exec. Order No. 13,507, 74 Fed. Reg. 17,071 (Apr. 8, 2009). 
 6 Solicitor General Elena Kagan has written a leading article in defense of presidential au-
thority over executive branch agencies.  Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).  OIRA Administrator Cass Sunstein has advocated applying 
White House review of regulations to independent agencies.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 500 (1987) (describing “in-
creased presidential control of all regulatory agencies”—including independent agen-
cies—as “highly desirable”). 
 7 Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 
2009).  By “independent agencies,” of course, the memorandum means those agencies 
headed by officials not subject to at-will removal by the President. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Memorandum on Implementing Government Reform, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 28 
(July 16, 2001) (“Independent agencies are requested to comply with this memoran-
dum.”). 
 10 See, e.g., Federalism, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999) (“Independent regulatory agen-
cies are encouraged to comply with the provisions of this order.”); Plain Language in 
Government Writing, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,885 (June 1, 1998) (“I ask the independent agen-
cies to comply with these directives.”); Memorandum on Implementing Management Re-
form in the Executive Branch, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,393 (Oct. 1, 1993) (“Independent agencies 
are requested to adhere to this directive.”). 
 11 Strauss, supra note 2, at 702. 
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example, he announced a “new direction” in national energy policy, 
including making the commitment that “[w]e will start by implement-
ing new standards for model year 2011 so that we use less oil and 
families have access to cleaner, more efficient cars and trucks.”12  At 
the same time, he stated he was “directing the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency to immediately review the [Bush Administration’s] de-
nial of the California waiver request,”13 a denial which prohibited 
California under the Clean Air Act from adopting new automobile 
emissions on greenhouse gases.14 
Later in the spring of 2009, the White House publicly announced 
a rulemaking proceeding jointly undertaken by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA).15  According to the White House an-
nouncement, “President Obama today—for the first time in history—
set in motion a new national policy aimed at both increasing fuel 
economy and reducing greenhouse gas pollution for all new cars and 
trucks sold in the United States.”16  That same announcement quoted 
EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson as crediting President Obama with 
having “brought all stakeholders to the table and [come] up with a 
plan to help the auto industry, safeguard consumers, and protect 
human health and the environment.”17  A separate “regulatory an-
nouncement” issued by the EPA made clear that the agency was carry-
ing out “the President’s policy.”18 
In another policy domain, President Obama publicly declared in 
June 2009 his administration’s commitment to ending the agency-
 
 12 Remarks on Energy, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Jan. 26, 2009); see also Memorandum 
on the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Jan. 
26, 2009). 
 13 Remarks on Energy, supra note 12. 
 14 For Obama’s order to the EPA, see Memorandum for the Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 74 Fed. Reg. 4905 (Jan. 26, 2009). 
 15 74 Fed. Reg. 24,007 (May 22, 2009). The White House press office announced the deci-
sion to initiate a rulemaking before the agencies did, making clear that “the agencies and 
the White House worked closely . . . in developing this historic proposal.”  Press Back-
ground Briefing, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, White House Announcement on 
Auto Emissions and Efficiency Standards (May 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Background-Briefing-on-Auto-Emissions-
and-Efficiency-Standards. 
 16 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, President Obama Announces Na-
tional Fuel Efficiency Policy, 2009 WL 1388410 (May 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/President-Obama-Announces-National-
Fuel-Efficiency-Policy. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Regulatory Announcement, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Office of Transp. & Air Quality, EPA 
Will Propose Historic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles (May 
2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/420f09028.pdf. 
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imposed ban prohibiting HIV-positive individuals from entering the 
United States, noting that his White House was making “a first and 
very big step towards ending this policy.”19  Although the Department 
of Health and Human Services’ final rule lifting the entry ban did not 
appear in the Federal Register until November 2, 2009,20 President Ob-
ama made a point to announce the final rule himself in a public ap-
pearance on October 30, 2009.21 
REACTIONS TO BUSH AND OBAMA DIRECTIVES 
At least at this early juncture, the Obama Administration has sig-
naled little retreat from the same kinds of assertions of presidential 
influence over administrative agencies that previous administrations 
have made.  To date, what criticism President Obama has received for 
exercising presidential power over agencies has centered mainly on 
his appointment of numerous policy “czars.”22  Although most of this 
criticism predictably has come from the political right,23 at least a few 
Democratic members of Congress have raised questions as well.24  The 
White House’s response to these concerns has been to emphasize 
that Obama’s presidential advisors do not “supplant or replace” ad-
ministrative agencies but instead (merely) “help coordinate their ef-
forts and help devise comprehensive solutions to complex prob-
 
 19 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at LGBT Pride Month Reception, 
White House (June 29, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Remarks-by-the-President-at-LGBT-Pride-Month-Reception/. 
 20 Medical Examination of Aliens—Removal of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) 
from Definition of Communicable Disease of Public Health Significance, 74 Fed. Reg. 
56,547 (Nov. 2, 2009). 
 21 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of the Ryan White 
HIV/AIDS Treatment Extension Act of 2009, White House (Oct. 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-ryan-white-
hivaids-treatment-extension-act-2009. 
 22 See, e.g., Tom Hamburger & Christi Parsons, White House Czar Inflation Stirs Concern, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, at A1.  The conservative activist group Judicial Watch has placed 
President Obama on its list of “most corrupt” politicians in part over the number of spe-
cial White House policy advisors.  Tom Fitton, Judicial Watch Announces List of Washing-
ton’s “Ten Most Wanted Corrupt Politicians” for 2009, http://www.judicialwatch.org/
weeklyupdate/2010/53-dcs-ten-most-wanted-corrupt-politicians-2009 (last visited Jan. 29, 
2010). 
 23 John McCain has quipped, “Obama has more czars than the Romanovs . . . .”  John 
McCain, Twitter, http://twitter.com/SenJohnMcCain/status/1972425520 (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2010). 
 24 Senators Robert Byrd and Russell Feingold have publicly raised questions about Obama’s 
czars.  See, e.g., Manu Raju, Democrats Join GOP Czar Wars, POLITICO, Sept. 17, 2009, avail-
able at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0909/27265.html. 
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lems.”25  Borrowing the logic found in Calabresi and Yoo’s recent 
book, the White House has stressed that “[e]very President has struc-
tured his staff in this manner . . . .  This is, and always has been, the 
traditional role of White House staff.”26 
Other than the issue of policy czars, the reaction to the Obama 
Administration’s presidentialist tendencies so far has been remarka-
bly muted, at least in comparison with the controversy that sur-
rounded the Bush Administration when it took similar actions.  The 
contrast in reactions to the two administrations suggests that at base 
politics motivates even supposedly legal debates over the President’s 
power to control administrative agencies. 
The Bush Administration, for example, garnered intense criticism 
when its EPA denied the State of California’s request for a waiver un-
der the Clean Air Act to adopt automobile emissions standards for 
greenhouse gases.  Ordinarily, automobile emissions standards are 
imposed by the federal EPA and apply nationally, but the Clean Air 
Act allows the EPA to grant California a waiver to adopt emissions 
standards that differ from federal ones.27  In 2004, California took 
steps to impose greenhouse gas emissions standards for cars sold in 
the state.28  No federal greenhouse gas emissions standards existed at 
the time, so California applied for a waiver which the EPA needed to 
grant before the state standards could take effect.29  The Act requires 
the EPA to grant such a waiver request unless the agency specifically 
finds that, among other things, California “does not need such stan-
dards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions.”30  The EPA 
has generally approved these waivers in the past for other air pollut-
ants,31 and the EPA’s career staff recommended to President Bush’s 
EPA Administrator, Stephen Johnson, that he grant the greenhouse 
 
 25 Letter from Gregory B. Craig, Counsel to the President, to Russell D. Feingold, U.S. Sena-
tor 3 (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://theplumline.whorunsgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/10/feingoldletter.pdf. 
 26 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 27 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2009). 
 28 Letter from Catherine Witherspoon, Executive Officer, Cal. Air Res. Bd., to Stephen L. 
Johnson, EPA Administrator, Attachment 2 (Dec. 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=E
PA-HQ-OAR-2006-0173-0004.1 (requesting a waiver of pre-emption for greenhouse gas 
regulations). 
 29 Letter from Catherine Witherspoon, Executive Officer, Cal. Air Res. Bd., to Stephen L. 
Johnson, EPA Administrator (Dec. 21, 2005) available at http://www.regulations.gov/
fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=EPA-HQ-OAR-2006-0173-0017. 
 30 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2009). 
 31 JAMES E. MCCARTHY & ROBERT MELTZ, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS:  CALIFORNIA’S WAIVER 
REQUEST TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT 11–12 (2007), 
available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Oct/RL34099.pdf. 
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gas waiver request.32  Johnson apparently even gave some indications 
to his staff that he was inclined to grant the request.33 
After interactions with OIRA—and perhaps even with President 
Bush himself—Johnson announced in December 2007 that the EPA 
would deny California’s waiver request.34  He argued that any climate 
change resulting from greenhouse gas emissions would affect every 
state and, as such, that California failed to demonstrate that it would 
suffer “extraordinary” conditions meriting special standards.35  The 
political reaction to the EPA’s denial was swift and vehement.  One 
powerful member of Congress, Representative Henry Waxman (D-
California) conducted hearings, requested thousands of pages of EPA 
and White House documents, and leveled heated accusations at EPA 
Administrator Johnson for improperly submitting to presidential in-
fluence.  As Waxman said to Johnson in one hearing: 
And then you reversed yourself after you had a candid conversation with 
the White House . . . [So] that would indicate you are getting input from 
the President, which you may think is important. 
But it also may indicate that the President is really making the decisions. 
What we need to do our oversight job is to find out on what basis he is 
telling you that you ought to make a different decision than what you ini-
tially proposed. 
. . . . 
The law does not provide that this is the president’s decision.  So this is 
your decision.36 
Johnson did testify to Congress that he in fact made the final deci-
sions about EPA policies, but he also refused to disclose what, if any-
thing, President Bush might have said to him.37 
As already noted, shortly upon assuming office in January 2009, 
President Obama took a direct interest in the EPA’s handling of the 
California waiver request and instructed the agency to revisit its de-
nial.38  Of course, President Obama’s memorandum directing the 
 
 32 Memorandum from the Majority Staff, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to Mem-
bers of the Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, U.S. House of Representatives 1 (May 
19, 2008). 
 33 Id. at 2. 
 34 Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, EPA Administrator, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Gover-
nor of Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-
slj.pdf. 
 35 California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 
2008). 
 36 EPA’s New Ozone Standards:  Hearing Before the Oversight and Government Reform Comm., 110th 
Cong. 146 (2008) [hereinafter Hearings]. 
 37 Id. at 137. 
 38 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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agency was careful not to tell the EPA that it must reverse itself and 
grant California’s waiver request; instead it simply directed the agen-
cy to revisit the issue and take appropriate action.  There was no 
doubt, however, that Obama wanted the waiver granted.  He had said 
as much on the campaign trail, and he promised after his election to 
take a bold new stance on climate change.39  In the speech in which 
he announced his directive to EPA, President Obama said: 
[T]he federal government must work with, not against, states to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.  California has shown bold and bipartisan lea-
dership through its effort to forge 21st century standards . . . .  But in-
stead of serving as a partner, Washington stood in [the] way.  . . . 
The days of Washington dragging its heels are over.  . . .  And that’s why 
I’m directing the Environmental Protection Agency to immediately re-
view the denial of the California waiver request and determine the best 
way forward.  This will help us create incentives to develop new energy 
that will make us less dependent on oil that endangers our security, our 
economy, and our planet.40 
It is hard to imagine anyone being unsure of what the President 
wanted his appointee as the head of the EPA to do. 
Interestingly, instead of receiving criticism for interfering in the 
business of the EPA, Obama reaped praise from those who had been 
critical of the Bush Administration.  Representative Waxman appar-
ently forgot that he previously claimed the decision was not for the 
President but for the EPA Administrator to make.  Lauding the Pres-
ident for his directive to EPA, Waxman stated, “This is a tremendous 
and long overdue step for energy independence and the environ-
ment.  President Obama is taking the nation in a decisive new direc-
tion that will receive broad support across the country.”41 
What distinguishes the Obama Administration’s handling of the 
California waiver request from the Bush Administration’s?  It is not 
that one President attempted to influence an agency’s policy and the 
other did not, nor is it that one President effectively directed agency 
 
 39 See, e.g., Thomas D. Elias, Obama Embraces Arnold’s Greenhouse Standards, SAN JOSE MERCURY 
NEWS, Nov. 26, 2008; Samantha Young, Schwarzenegger Opens Climate Summit with Obama, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 18, 2008; Barack Obama and Joe Biden:  New Energy for Amer-
ica Plan, available at http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/factsheet_energy_speech_
080308.pdf. 
 40 Remarks on Energy, supra note 12. 
 41 Representative Henry A. Waxman, Chairman Waxman Commends President Obama’s 
Action on California Waiver, http://waxman.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx? 
DocumentID=111753 (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). 
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policy and the other did not.  Rather, the major difference lies in the 
policy outcomes between the two administrations.42 
THE DEBATE OVER PRESIDENTIAL POWER:  LAW OR POLITICS? 
Judgments about policy outcomes not surprisingly affect judg-
ments about presidential power.  Recent debates over presidential in-
volvement in administrative policymaking undoubtedly have been in-
fluenced by, if not infused with, political ideology.  The question 
arises, then, whether the “oldest debate in constitutional law” is really 
a debate about law at all.  Although partisans invoke the Constitution 
to bolster their claims, ultimately politics underlies criticisms of Pres-
idents for exercising too much power over administrative agencies.  
This is not to deny the importance of law more generally in the ad-
ministrative state.  Rather, it is to say that the supposed constitutional 
rule limiting Presidents to mere oversight of agencies is incapable of 
neutrally circumscribing either presidential or administrative behav-
ior. 
The purported legal rule at issue distinguishes between presiden-
tial influence (or oversight) and presidential control (or decision), 
the former being permissible and the latter not.43  The rule is prem-
ised on the delegation of authority by Congress to agencies rather 
than to Presidents.  When an agency possesses delegated authority 
under a statute, agency heads—and not the President—must be the 
ultimate deciders of domestic policy made under authority of that 
statute.  Yet even under this view, a President can still oversee what 
agencies do.  The President, as the head of the executive branch, may 
lawfully try to influence agencies’ actions and can even remove the 
head of an agency who does not follow the President’s wishes. 
Unfortunately, any theoretical difference between influence and 
control, or between oversight and decision, will not be observed in 
practice.  It is not just that, like with many legal rules, there will be 
 
 42 It could possibly be argued that what explains the differences in reaction to the two ad-
ministrations was that Obama has been open about his directives to the EPA, whereas 
President Bush was secretive.  But everyone knows that EPA decisions go to the White 
House for review, so it never was any secret that the Bush White House was involved in 
EPA matters.  Presumably the only plausible objection to secrecy in communications be-
tween President Bush and the EPA Administrator is that President Bush may have said 
something nefarious to convince Administrator Johnson to deny California’s waiver re-
quest.  Probably a strong correlation exists between that kind of fear and one’s policy pre-
ferences, such that it is still safe to conclude that the meaningful difference in reactions 
to Bush and Obama stems from observers’ views about the outcomes of each EPA’s pro-
ceedings. 
 43 For a recent formulation and defense of this rule, see Strauss, supra note 2. 
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hard cases or a gray area between the two extremes of lawful and un-
lawful.  Rather, the two extremes themselves are, practically speaking, 
indistinguishable.  One person’s “oversight” will be another person’s 
“decision.”  The supposed constraining principle on presidential di-
rective authority actually provides nothing but another political ar-
gument that can be leveled against a President whose policy out-
comes a critic opposes. 
The purported legal rule also does nothing to prevent a President 
from exercising the strongest possible control over an agency:  name-
ly, placing a clone in the position of agency head.  The rule is never 
even implicated when a President appoints an administrator who 
agrees with the President.  In all likelihood, President Obama’s 
choice for EPA Administrator already agreed that the EPA should 
grant the California waiver request.  If she reversed the EPA’s earlier 
decision even absent any presidential communication, President Ob-
ama’s control would have been at its apex and yet he also would have 
done nothing to trigger the purported constitutional rule. 
We can envision, of course, other cases where an administrator 
does not initially agree with the President but nevertheless eventually 
acquiesces.  Even in such cases, will anyone ever truly know for sure 
how much the President controlled the outcome?  Given their vul-
nerability to congressional oversight and political criticism (if not 
purported legal objections), administrators who decide to act as 
“good soldiers” for their Presidents know they not only need to follow 
orders but they must not admit they are doing so.  Thus we find Ste-
phen Johnson, Bush’s EPA Administrator, responding to Representa-
tive Waxman: 
I know that the chairman and other members of the committee disagree 
with my decision and I understand that.  It’s—these decisions are not 
easy decisions, but I made the right decision.  I made the decision based 
upon the facts, based upon the law, what the law directs me to and I 
stand by that and it was my decision and my decision alone.44 
Administrators can always claim their decisions were their decisions 
alone.  They can do this in part because of the protective secrecy of 
White House deliberations.  They also can do this because of the ne-
cessity that administrators be the individuals formally taking action, 
given statutes authorizing only the administrator to do so.  At the end 
of the day, only the administrator’s signature appears on an adminis-
trative rule or order, so in that formal sense it will always be possible 
to say that a decision was an administrator’s alone. 
 
 44 See Hearings, supra note 36, at 145. 
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For these same reasons, Presidents can recite that their adminis-
trators make the ultimate decisions.  Despite its otherwise presiden-
tialist tendencies, for example, the Obama White House has used 
language respectful of administrative agencies’ decisional authority.  
In responding to a controversial decision to open a criminal investi-
gation into certain Central Intelligence Agency’s interrogation tac-
tics, President Obama made a point to state, “I want to make sure that 
as president of the United States that I’m not asserting in some way 
that my decisions overrule the decisions of prosecutors who are there 
to uphold the law.”45  Similarly, in responding to questions about the 
administration’s handling of an attempted airline bombing on De-
cember 25, 2009, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs made a 
point to note that President Obama’s Attorney General made the fi-
nal decision: 
Q:  [W]ho made the decision to try [the suspect] in federal court?  Was 
the President aware of this decision when he began being processed in 
the legal system? 
MR. GIBBS:  Well, again, understand that the decision to try him was 
handed down in an indictment that I think took place many days after-
ward.  So, yes, all the team was involved in that. 
. . . . 
Q:  And who made the decision to try him in federal court?  Did the Pres-
ident make that call? 
MR. GIBBS:  I believe that decision is made by the Attorney General.46 
In cases like these, Presidents may even find it politically expedient to 
claim distance from the decision at hand, even if they had been cen-
trally involved in making it.  Such may well be the case with President 
Obama. 
Of course, some observers may read such statements from the 
Obama White House to indicate that the current administration re-
spects constitutional limits on presidential directive authority.  If that 
is what should be inferred from these statements, then no necessary 
conclusion follows that the Obama Administration is special in this 
respect.  The Bush Administration, after all, knew how to use the 
same kind of language.  When asked by the press about the EPA’s de-
cision to deny California’s waiver request, President Bush’s Deputy 
 
 45 CQ Politics, CQ Transcript:  President Obama on CBS’s ‘Face the Nation’, 
http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000003206310 (last visited Jan. 29, 
2010). 
 46 Briefing by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs and PERAB Chief Economist Aus-
tan Goolsbee, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House (Jan. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/briefing-white-house-press-secretary-robert-
gibbs-and-perab-chief-economist-austan-. 
648 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:2 
 
Press Secretary acknowledged that the decision was clearly EPA’s to 
make: 
[T]he EPA Administrator made his independent decision on whether to 
approve or not approve that waiver.  He made a decision not to approve 
the California waiver, and as he explained, I think, he made that based 
on what he thought was best for the nation in addressing this issue. . . .  
We support EPA Administrator Johnson’s decision, but it was his decision 
to make.47 
Such recitations of administrator primacy by both the Bush and Ob-
ama Administrations suggest how easy it is for Presidents to adhere 
formally to a legal distinction between oversight and decision.  As 
long as the ink on signed administrative rules or orders comes from 
pens controlled by the hands of administrators, Presidents will always 
be able to claim that their administrators made the final decisions. 
To be sure, administrators do face a separate, statutory-based, le-
gal rule that compels them to give reasons for their actions, so as to 
withstand judicial scrutiny under the arbitrary and capricious test.48  
Reasons, though, can be constructed.  We do not find administrators 
stating that they took particular actions simply because their career 
staff told them to do so, although this surely must happen with some 
frequency.  Similarly, we do not see, nor would we expect to see, ad-
ministrators claiming that they took an action simply because a Presi-
dent told them to do so.  Credible or not, administrators and their 
staffs do manage to come up with reasons. 
Those who invoke the Constitution as a basis for a distinction be-
tween presidential influence and control, and who then argue that 
this distinction imposes a limit on presidential power, do at least rec-
ognize that the distinction is both “subtle” and unenforceable by 
courts.49  The only way to enforce such a distinction and ensure Pres-
idents never unduly influenced their administrators would be to im-
pose an outright ban on any communications between executive 
branch administrators and the President and White House staff, a re-
sponse that would be both grossly overbroad and unconstitutional.50  
As no court, nor anyone else, can peer into the inner workings of 
administrators’ minds, courts will remain unable to enforce a legal 
limit on presidential authority based on a distinction between influ-
ence and control. 
 
 47 Press Gaggle, Tony Fratto, Deputy Press Sec’y, White House (Dec. 21, 2007), available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071221-5.html. 
 48 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2009). 
 49 See Strauss, supra note 2, at 704. 
 50 By its very terms, the Constitution contemplates communication between agencies and 
Presidents.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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CONCLUSION 
If the constitutional debate over presidential power is defined as 
one between permissible influence and impermissible control of ad-
ministrative agencies, the nation appears to have nothing but politics 
to police this debate.  Administrators will always face substantial po-
litical reasons to do their President’s bidding, and yet for political 
reasons they also can be expected to continue to deny that anyone 
but they controlled their decisions.  The unobservable nature of the 
purported constitutional distinction between presidential influence 
and control not only makes the distinction legally unenforceable, but 
it also means that partisan critics of any President will continue to be 
able to invoke the distinction to level accusations of improper entan-
glement in decisions of administrative agencies.  No one, not least 
the nation’s judges, will be able to adjudicate such claims in a consis-
tent manner, untethered from political considerations. 
In the end, perhaps politics is exactly where the debate should be 
left.  If no meaningful or practical legal constraint exists on presiden-
tial directive power, that does not mean that Presidents face no con-
straints at all—nor that “executive tyranny”51 will necessarily follow.  
To policymakers in Washington, whether in the White House or in 
agencies, political constraints are not trivial.  Agency administrators 
acquiescing to their Presidents still have to contend with the power of 
unhappy members of Congress who can call administrators to task, 
override their decisions with legislation, or cut their appropriations.  
Presidents, too, must contend with objections from these same mem-
bers of Congress as well as from members of the public, from whom 
Presidents draw their ultimate legitimacy and their most practically 
important source of power.  When the force of these political con-
straints is compared with the impact of an asserted legal principle 
that no court can enforce, it would seem that politics provides the 
main, if not only, limit on the President’s position over the adminis-
trative state. 
 
 51 See Strauss, supra note 2, at 705. 
